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RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES1
Elias Tsakas
We consider agents whose language can only express probabilistic beliefs that attach
a rational number to every event. We call these probability measures rational. We intro-
duce the notion of a rational belief hierarchy, where the rst order beliefs are described
by a rational measure over the fundamental space of uncertainty, the second order beliefs
are described by a rational measure over the product of the fundamental space of un-
certainty and the opponent's rst order rational beliefs, and so on. Then, we derive the
corresponding (rational) type space model, thus providing a Bayesian representation of
rational belief hierarchies. Our rst main result shows that this type-based representa-
tion violates our intuitive idea of an agent whose language expresses only rational beliefs,
in that there are rational types associated with non-rational beliefs over the canonical
state space. We rule out these types by focusing on the rational types that satisfy com-
mon certainty in the event that everybody holds rational beliefs over the canonical state
space. We call these types universally rational and show that they are characterized
by a bounded rationality condition which restricts the agents' computational capacity.
Moreover, the universally rational types form a dense subset of the universal type space.
Finally, we show that the strategies rationally played under common universally rational
belief in rationality generically coincide with those satisfying correlated rationalizability.
Keywords: Epistemic game theory, bounded rationality, rational numbers, belief hier-
archies, type spaces, unawareness, computational capacity, common belief in rationality.
1. INTRODUCTION
A belief hierarchy is a description of an agent's beliefs about some fundamental space of uncertainty,
beliefs about everybody else's beliefs, and so on. During the past few decades, belief hierarchies have
become an integral tool of modern economic theory, often used to analyze games with incomplete
information (Harsanyi, 1967-68), as well as in order to provide epistemic characterizations for sev-
eral solution concepts, such as rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987; Tan and Werlang,
1988), Nash equilibrium (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995), and correlated equilibrium (Aumann,
1987), just to mention a few1.
Belief hierarchies are in general very complex objects, consisting of innite sequences of probabil-
ity measures. This makes them in principle very hard to handle and sometimes even to describe,
especially when it comes to high order beliefs. Having recognized this diculty, Harsanyi (1967-68)
1I am indebted to...
1For an overview of the epistemic game theory literature we refer to the textbook by Perea (2012) or the review
article by Brandenburger (2008).
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proposed an indirect Bayesian representation of belief hierarchies, known as the type space model2.
Formally, Harsanyi's model consists of a set of types for each agent and a continuous function mapping
each type to the corresponding conditional beliefs over the product of the fundamental space of uncer-
tainty and the opponent's type space. This structure induces a belief hierarchy for every type, thus re-
ducing the innite-dimensional regression of beliefs to a single-dimensional type. Mertens and Zamir
(1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) independently completed the analysis by showing the
existence of the universal type space, which represents all belief hierarchies satisfying some standard
coherency properties.
In this paper we restrict attention to agents whose language does not contain sentences of the
form \the event E occurs with probability p", where p is an irrational number, e.g., Alexandra
cannot express the sentence \tomorrow it will rain with probability
p
2=2" within the bounds of
her language. This is for instance the case when she is unaware of the notion of irrational num-
bers (Modica and Rustichini, 1999; Heifetz et al., 2006). Alternatively, she may be aware of the fact
that there are irrational numbers in the interval [0; 1], but still conceptually not understand them
(Lehtinen et al., 1997). This type of beliefs are modeled by probability measures that attach a rational
number to every Borel event. We call these measures rational.
Obviously, if an agent understands only rational numbers, it is not only her rst order beliefs that
are restricted but also her beliefs about everybody else's beliefs, and so on. For instance, besides
Alexandra not understanding the sentence \tomorrow it will rain with probability
p
2=2", she also
does not understand either the sentence \with probability
p
3=3, Barney attaches probability p to
tomorrow raining", or the sentence \with probability q, Barney attaches probability
p
5=5 to tomorrow
raining". In other words, the belief hierarchy of an agent whose language is restricted to express only
rational beliefs consists of a sequence of rational probability measures, where the rst order (rational)
beliefs are described by a rational measure over the underlying space of uncertainty, the second order
(rational) beliefs are described by a rational measure over the product of the fundamental space of
uncertainty and the opponent's space of rational rst order beliefs, and so on. We call this innite
regression of probability measures rational belief hierarchy.
Following Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), we construct a Harsanyi
type space representation of rational belief hierarchies. However, as our rst main result (Theorem
4.1) shows, this Bayesian representation has an odd and at the same time undesirable property.
Namely, it contains rational types which are represented by non-rational probability measures over
2Later, Aumann (1976) introduced an alternative representation, the partitional model, which is essentially equiv-
alent to Harsanyi's type-based structure.
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the product of the fundamental space of uncertainty and the opponent's rational type space. In other
words, there is some Borel event in the canonical state space3 to which this rational type attaches
an irrational conditional probability even though every order of her belief hierarchy involves only
rational beliefs. Obviously, the latter contradicts our initial idea of an agent whose language cannot
describe non-rational probabilistic beliefs.
In order to make our formal model consistent with our intuitive idea of agents who do not un-
derstand irrational numbers, we consider only those rational types that (i) are associated with ra-
tional conditional beliefs over the canonical state space, and (ii) satisfy common certainty in the
event that everybody's conditional beliefs are rational. We call these types universally rational (U-
rational), and we show the existence of a Bayesian representation of these types in the same line as
Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993). Notice that the space of U -rational
types is derived by imposing a sequence of restrictions in the associated type space model, and there-
fore it is not straightforward how these conditions translate into restrictions on the space of rational
belief hierarchies, which at the end of the day is our primitive concept. Our second main result (The-
orem 5.1) lls this gap by characterizing the space of universally rational types in terms of a second
bounded rationality condition imposed directly on the belief hierarchies. This condition restricts the
agent's computational capacity, and more specically her ability to divide natural numbers. In our
context, we say that an agent's computational capacity is bounded by a nite subset of the natural
numbers N  N, whenever the agent's belief hierarchy consists of a sequence of measures that assign
probabilities that can be written as ratios with the denominator belonging to N . In other words,
bounded computational capacity means that the agent can only divide with nitely many natural
numbers. Then, we prove that a type is U -rational if and only if it (i) has bounded computational
capacity, and (ii) satises common certainty in the event that everybody has bounded computational
capacity. Notice that the previous conditions do not require the agent to believe that everybody else
has the same computational capacity as herself, e.g., Alexandra's computational capacity may be
bounded by f1; : : : ; n 1g and still believe that Barney attaches probability 1=n to some event. This
also implies that bounded computational capacity weaker than bounded language.
Although the space of universally rational types satises quite a few restrictions, we can still show
that it is rather rich. Namely, the space of U -rational types forms a dense subset of the universal
type space, implying that every belief hierarchy can be approximated by a sequence of types whose
language cannot express irrational beliefs. This may be of particular interest from a practical point
3The canonical state space is dened as the product of the fundamental space of uncertainty and the type spaces of
each agent.
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of view, in that we often prefer to use \small" type spaces, but which are still suciently rich to
approximate every belief hierarchy at an arbitrarily high order (Lipman, 2003; Dekel et al., 2006).
The latter has recently attracted quite a lot of attention among authors who study the robustness of
solution concepts in incomplete information games with regards to small perturbations in the belief
hierarchies (Ely and Peski, 2006; Dekel et al., 2007).
In the last part of the paper, we introduce the concept of common (universally) rational be-
lief in rationality, as the natural analogue to common belief in rationality, which is the set of
epistemic conditions that characterize correlated rationalizability (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987;
Tan and Werlang, 1988; Friedenberg and Keisler, 2011). Obviously, since the universal type space
is a superset of the set of U -rational types, the strategy proles rationally played under common
U -rational belief in rationality will be a subset of the ones rationally played under under common
belief in rationality, which are the ones surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Hence, our concept is in general a renement of correlated rationalizability. However, as we show this
is the case in a very small subset of all games, as the two concepts yield the same outcomes generi-
cally (Theorem 7.1). Observe that common U -rational belief in rationality diers from other concepts
in the literature that place ex ante restrictions on the type space (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003;
Battigalli and Friedenberg, 2012). The reason is that we restrict the entire belief hierarchy, rather
than just the rst order beliefs.
This paper belongs to a growing new strand of research within epistemic game theory, that of
bounded reasoning in games. This literature is actually the product of introducing bounded rational-
ity assumptions to the players' belief formation and/or understanding of the game, and has developed
parallelly to the emergence of related empirical evidence in the experimental economics literature.
Examples include players who are not fully aware of all elements of the game (Dekel et al., 1998;
Halpern, 2001; Heifetz et al., 2006; Li, 2009), players with nite depth of reasoning (Kets, 2010;
Heifetz and Kets, 2011; Strzalecki, 2011), players with ambiguous beliefs (Ahn, 2007), or players
whose beliefs are only nitely additive (Meier, 2006).
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce rational probability measures and
we prove some of their properties; Section 3 extends this framework to an interactive setting by
introducing rational belief hierarchies; In Section 4 we construct the rational type space and show
the existence of a type associated with an non-rational measure over the canonical state space; In
Section 5 we introduce the universally rational types, provide their corresponding Bayesian represen-
tation, as well as their foundation in terms of a second bounded rationality assumption; Section 6
contains some topological properties of rational type spaces; In Section 7, we show that the outcomes
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rationally played under common universally rational belief in rationality generically coincide with
those surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies; Section 8 concludes.
2. RATIONAL PROBABILITY MEASURES
We begin with some denitions and the basic notation. Let X be a Polish4 space, together with the
Borel -algebra, B. As usual, (X) denotes the space of probability measures on (X;B), endowed
with the topology of weak convergence5. For each  2 (X), let supp() denote the support, i.e.,
the smallest closed subset6 of X that receives probability 1 by .
Consider the Borel probability measures that assign to every Borel event a rational number.
Definition 1 We dene the set of rational probability measures by
(2.1) Q(X) :=
n
 2 (X) : (B) 2 Q;8B 2 B
o
:
We use rational probability measures to model the beliefs of an agent whose language does not con-
tain sentences of the form \E occurs with probability p", where p is an irrational number. This idea is
strongly related to one underlying the notion of awareness, in that an agent is aware of an event if and
only if this event can be described by a sentence within her language (Modica and Rustichini, 1999;
Heifetz et al., 2006). We come back to the relationship of our work to the literature on unawareness
later in the paper.
Below, we provide some results on rational probability measures, which we will use later in the
paper. Throughout this section, unless stated otherwise, we assume that X is separable and metriz-
able.
Proposition 2.1 Every  2 Q(X) has a nite support.
The previous, quite surprising result rules out all probability measures with countably innite
support, even if each point in the support receives a rational probability. The following example
illustrates such a case.
4A topological space is called Polish whenever it is separable and completely metrizable. Examples of Polish spaces
include countable sets endowed with the discrete topology and Rn together with the usual topology. Closed subsets
of Polish spaces endowed with the relative topology are Polish. The countable product of Polish spaces, together with
the product topology, is also Polish.
5The topology of weak convergence, which is usually denoted by w, is the coarsest topology that makes the mapping
 7! R fd continuous, for every bounded and continuous real-valued function, f . If X is Polish, then (X) endowed
with the topology of weak convergence is also Polish. For further properties of w, we refer to Aliprantis and Border
(1994, Ch. 15).
6If X is separable and metrizable, the support is unique (Parthasarathy, 1967, Thm. 2.1).
6 ELIAS TSAKAS
Example 2.1 Let X = fx1; x2; : : : g and suppose that  2 (X) assigns probability 2 k to each xk.
It is straightforward verifying that  is a probability measure. Now, consider an arbitrary  2 (0; 1),
and construct the Borel subset B  X so that xk 2 B if and only if  2 [ 12k ; 22k ) [    \ [2
k 1
2k
; 1).
Observe that  = (B), implying that for every irrational  there is a Borel event receiving an
irrational probability, and therefore  is not a rational measure. /
The following result proves that every Borel probability measure can be approximated by a sequence
of rational probability measures (in the topology of weak convergence).
Proposition 2.2 Q(X) is dense in (X).
Before moving forward, let us rst introduce the concept of N-rational probability measures. For
some nite N  N, consider the subset of the rational numbers,
QN := fm=n : m = 0; : : : ; n ; n 2 Ng;
and dene the set of N -rational probability measures by
(2.2) N(X) :=
n
 2 (X) : (B) 2 QN ;8B 2 B
o
:
Obviously, if N M  N, then N(X)  M(X).
We use N -rational probability measures to describe the beliefs of an agent whose computational
capacity is bounded in that, not only can she not attach an irrational probability to any event, but
moreover she can only divide with nitely many numbers, i.e., those in N .
Proposition 2.3 N(X) is closed in (X).
Obviously, it follows by Proposition 2.2 that N(X) is not closed if N is innite. The following
result is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.4 Q(X) is a Borel subset of (X).
3. RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES
Let  be a Polish space together with the Borel -algebra, B0. In a game, each  2  corresponds
to a payo vector (Harsanyi, 1967-68), or a strategy prole (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995;
Tan and Werlang, 1988), or a combination of the two. Throughout the paper, we refer to  as the
underlying | else called, fundamental | space of uncertainty. Let I = fa; bg be the set of agents7,
7Our analysis can be directly generalized to any nite set of agents, in which case we obviously allow for correlated
beliefs, as usual.
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with typical elements i and j. Each agent forms beliefs about  (rst order beliefs), beliefs about
the opponent's beliefs about  (second order beliefs), and so on. Such a sequence is called a belief
hierarchy.
Formally, consider the following sequence of Polish spaces:
	0 := 
	1 := 	0 (	0)
...
	k+1 := 	k (	k)
...
A belief hierarchy is an element of
(3.1) T0 :=
1Y
k=0
(	k):
For some (1; 2; : : : ) 2 T0, the Borel probability measure k 2 (	k 1) denotes the k-th order
beliefs.
In this paper, we consider agents whose language can express only rational beliefs. That is, for
some  2 , agent i does not understand the sentence:
  occurs with probability
p
2=2
The latter implies that we restrict i's rst order beliefs to the space of rational probability measures.
Furthermore, i does not understand any of the following sentences:
 the event that \j assigns probability
p
2=2 to " occurs with probability p
 the event that \j assigns probability q to " occurs with probability
p
3=3
That is, we restrict i's second order beliefs to rational probability measures over the space of rational
probability measures. Likewise, we restrict higher order beliefs. These restrictions are consistent with
the interpretation of rational beliefs as the states of mind of an agent who is unaware of the concept
of irrational numbers. We further elaborate on this later in the paper.
Formally, consider the sequence
0 := 
1 := 0 Q(0)
...
k+1 := k Q(k)
...
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A rational belief hierarchy is a sequence (1; 2; : : : ), with k 2 Q(k 1) denoting the k-th order
beliefs. Let
(3.2) TQ0 :=
1Y
k=0
Q(k)
denote the space of all rational belief hierarchies, endowed with the product topology.
Intuitively, rational belief hierarchies form a strict subset of all belief hierarchies. However, observe
that formally TQ0 is not a subset of T0, because strictly speaking 
Q(k) is not a subset of (	k).
Therefore, before moving forward, we would like to make sure that the intuitive idea of one being a
subset of the other is compatible with our formal model. The following result serves this purpose, by
showing that TQ0 is embedded as a Borel subset of T0.
Proposition 3.1 TQ0 is homeomorphic to a Borel subset of T0.
Throughout the paper, we denote this embedding by
(3.3) h : TQ0 ,! T0:
As usual, with slight abuse of terminology, whenever we talk about a rational belief hierarchy t 2 TQ0
we actually refer to its image h(t) 2 T0, and therefore we will informally consider TQ0 to be a Borel
subset of T0.
4. RATIONAL TYPES
In general, belief hierarchies are very large and complex objects, and as such it is really hard
directly working with them. Harsanyi (1967-68) was the rst one to circumvent this problem by
proposing a compact way of expressing belief hierarchies, known in the literature as the type space
model. Formally, this model consists of a tuple (; Ta; Tb; ga; gb), where Ti is a Polish space of types
with typical element ti, and gi : Ti ! (  Tj) is a continuous function. In a type space, each
ti 2 Ti is associated with a unique belief hierarchy derived as follows: For each type ti 2 Ti, the rst
order beliefs, 1(ti) 2 (	0), attach probability
(4.1) 1(ti)(B0) =
Z
(;tj):2B0
dgi(ti)
to every Borel event B0  	0. The second order beliefs, 2(ti) 2 (	1), attach probability
(4.2) 2(ti)(B1) =
Z
(;tj):(;1(tj))2B1
dgi(ti)
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to every Borel event B1  	1. Likewise, the k-th order beliefs, k(ti) 2 (	k 1), attach probability
(4.3) k(ti)(Bk 1) =
Z
(;tj):(;1(tj);:::;k 1(tj))2Bk 1
dgi(ti)
for every Borel subset Bk 1  	k 1. For a detailed presentation on how the entire belief hierarchy is
derived from a type space model, we refer to Siniscalchi (2007).
Observe that every type space induces a state space   Ti  Tj, and each ti 2 Ti is mapped to
a probability measure gi(ti), which can be viewed as a conditional belief over the state space given
the information set  ftig  Tj. We say that gi induces a Bayesian representation of Ti whenever
gi : Ti ! (Tj) is injective, thus ruling out the possibility of two dierent types being associated
with the same measure. We call a Bayesian representation complete, if gi is also surjective, implying
that every measure in ( Tj) is the image of some type in Ti.
Later, Mertens and Zamir (1985), and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) independently showed that
Harsanyi's framework is suciently rich to model all instances of interactive uncertainty, in that there
is a type space model (; T a ; T

b ; g

a; g

b ), with T

a = T

b = T
 and ga = g

b = g
, such that (i) T 
coincides with the set of all belief hierarchies satisfying certain standard coherency restrictions, and
(ii) g induces a complete Bayesian representation of T . This construction is called the universal
type space8.
They started by imposing a standard coherency condition, which states that the k-th and (k+1)-th
order beliefs cannot contradict each other. Formally, let Tc := f(1; 2; : : : ) 2 T0 : marg	k 2 k =
k 1;8k > 1g. Then, they showed (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993, Prop. 1) that there is a homeo-
morphism
(4.4) f : Tc ! ( T0):
This homeomorphism is a natural one, in that for all (1; 2; : : : ) 2 Tc,
(4.5) marg	k 1 f
(1; 2; : : : ) = k:
Then, they further restricted attention to belief hierarchies that satisfy, not only coherency, but also
8Heifetz (1993) generalized this representation result to cases where the underlying space of uncertainty is Hausdor,
while Heifetz and Samet (1998) further considered a purely measurable underlying space of uncertainty.
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common certainty in coherency. Formally, consider the following sequence of subsets of Tc:
T1 := Tc
T2 :=

t 2 Tc : f (t)( T1) = 1
	
...
Tk :=

t 2 Tc : f (t)( Tk 1) = 1
	
...
Observe that T1 contains the belief hierarchies satisfying coherency, T2 those satisfying certainty in
everybody's coherency, and so on. Thus,
(4.6) T  :=
1\
k=1
Tk
contains the belief hierarchies satisfying coherency and common certainty in coherency. Finally,
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993, Prop. 2) showed that there is a homeomorphism
(4.7) g : T  ! ( T );
implying that there is a complete Bayesian representation of T .
The rst natural question arising at this point is whether we can extend their result to the
case of rational belief hierarchies. In other words, is there a type space representation of ratio-
nal belief hierarchies in the same line as the standard results by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993).
We retain the standard coherency restriction. Formally, let
TQc :=

(1; 2; : : : ) 2 TQ0 : margk 2 k = k 1; 8k > 1
	
(4.8)
= TQ0 \ Tc
denote the set of coherent belief hierarchies.
Similarly to Brandenburger and Dekel (1993, Prop. 1), the following result associates each coher-
ent rational belief hierarchy to a probability measure over the product of the underlying space of
uncertainty and the space of the opponent's rational hierarchies. This induces an injective mapping,
implying that there is no pair of coherent types associated with the same distribution over  TQ0 .
Proposition 4.1 There is an injection f : TQc ! ( TQ0 ).
It is rather easy to see that the function f is in fact the same as f  from Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993, Prop. 1), but restricted to rational belief hierarchies, i.e., for every t 2 TQc and each Borel
RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES 11
subset B   TQ0 ,
(4.9) f(t)(B) = f (h(t))
 f(; t) 2  T0 : (; h 1(t)) 2 Bg:
Throughout the paper, we treat f and f as the same function. Note that f inherits from f  the
property of being a natural mapping, in that every coherent hierarchy is associated with a probability
measure over   Q1k=0Q(k) that has the property that its marginal distribution over k 1
coincides with the k-th order beliefs induced by this hierarchy, i.e., for every (1; 2; : : : ) 2 TQc
(4.10) margk 1 f(1; 2; : : : ) = k:
As usual, we further restrict belief hierarchies so that they satisfy, not only coherency, but also
common certainty in coherency. Formally, consider the following sequence of subsets of TQc :
TQ1 := T
Q
c
TQ2 :=

t 2 TQc : f(t)( TQ1 ) = 1
	
...
TQk :=

t 2 TQc : f(t)( TQk 1) = 1
	
...
Note that TQ1 contains the belief hierarchies that satisfy coherency, T
Q
2 contains the belief hierarchies
that satisfy certainty in everybody coherency, and so on. Thus, the types in
(4.11) TQ :=
1\
k=1
TQk
satisfy coherency and common certainty in coherency. Henceforth, whenever we write \rational belief
hierarchies" or \rational types", we implicitly refer to elements of TQ, thus omitting to explicitly
say that they satisfy coherency and common certainty in coherency. The following result proves the
existence of a Bayesian representation of the space of rational belief hierarchies, implying that every
type in TQ is identied by a probability measure on  TQ.
Proposition 4.2 There is an injection g : TQ ! ( TQ).
Once again, g coincides with the corresponding mapping g used by Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993, Prop. 2) when restricted on the domain h(TQ). That is, for every t 2 TQ and each Borel
subset B   TQ,
(4.12) g(t)(B) = g(h(t))
 f(; t) 2  TQ : (; h 1(t)) 2 Bg:
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Obviously, the representation induced by g is not complete, in that there are measures in (TQ)
which are not the image of any rational type. The latter is not surprising, as one can easily see that
there exist probability measures  2 (  TQ) with marg  =2 Q(), e.g., a measure with
(fg  TQ) = p2=2.
What is really interesting, as well as far from obvious, is the conclusion of the following theo-
rem. Let us rst introduce the notion of a rational representation: Consider a type space model
(; Ta; Tb; ga; gb) such that gi induces a Bayesian representation of Ti. We call this representation
rational whenever gi(t) 2 Q(  Tj) for every t 2 Ti. The reason we are particularly interested
in rational representations stems from our initial motivation for this project. Recall that we have
in mind agents whose language does not contain sentences that express probabilistic beliefs of the
form \E occurs with probability p", where p is an irrational number. Thus, if the representation
induced by g is not rational, it means that there is some rational type t 2 TQ attaching an irrational
probability to some Borel event in the canonical state space   TQ  TQ. Obviously, the latter
would not be consistent with the type of agents we have in mind.
Theorem 4.1 There is some t 2 TQ such that g(t) =2 Q( TQ).
The previous result has the following surprising implication for the Bayesian representation of
rational belief hierarchies: Although the agent's language can only describe rational beliefs, there are
types t 2 TQ associated with irrational beliefs over the canonical state space  TQ  TQ.
5. UNIVERSALLY RATIONAL BELIEF HIERARCHIES
In this section, we restrict our attention to rational types whose language does not contain sentences
that express non-rational probabilistic beliefs, i.e., we are interested in rational types which
(i) are associated with a rational probability measure over the canonical state space,
(ii) are certain that the opponent's beliefs satisfy (i),
(iii) are certain that the opponent's beliefs satisfy (ii),
and so on ad innitum.
Observe that these conditions rule out not only types with non-rational beliefs over the state space,
but also types that believe that their opponent has non-rational beliefs over the state space, and
so on. The belief hierarchies that satisfy these restrictions are called universally rational. First, we
prove that universally rational types have a complete rational Bayesian representation. Then, we
provide a foundation for these types in terms of a second type of bounded rationality which restricts
the computational capacity of the agent, and more specically the agent's ability to divide natural
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numbers.
Formally, a type is universally rational (U-rational), whenever it belongs to each of the following
subsets of TQ:
TU0 :=

t 2 TQ : g(t) 2 Q( TQ) 	
TU1 :=

t 2 TQ : g(t)( TU0 ) = 1
	
...
TUk :=

t 2 TQ : g(t)( TUk 1) = 1
	
...
Observe that TU0 contains exactly the types satisfying condition (i) above, T
U
1 contains exactly the
types satisfying (ii), and so on. Throughout the paper we denote the set of U -rational types by
(5.1) TU :=
1\
k=0
TUk :
The following result shows that there is a complete rational Bayesian representation of universally
rational belief hierarchies.
Proposition 5.1 g : TU ! Q( TU) is a homeomorphism.
Note that the previous result is not the product of restrictions on the belief hierarchies. Instead,
it rules out certain rational types based on a sequence of conditions on the corresponding Bayesian
model. Below, we characterize the space of U -rational types in terms of an additional (bounded
rationality) condition imposed directly on the beliefs hierarchies | which is our primitive notion |
rather on the associated type space which is only a model describing the belief hierarchies.
Recall the notion of N -rational measures introduced in Section 2, and consider an agent whose
computational capacity is restricted by some nite N  N, in that she can only form N -rational
beliefs. Intuitively, we have in mind an agent who exhibits a second type of bounded rationality in
that she can only divide by nitely many denominators, on top of the fact that her language contains
only sentences describing rational beliefs.
Notice that in principle we do not require the agent to believe that everybody else has the same
computational capacity as her, i.e., agent i's computational capacity may be restricted by some nite
N  N and still attach positive probability to the opponent's computational capacity being restricted
by M ) N , or even believe that her opponent's computational capacity is not restricted by any nite
M  N. That is, bounded computational capacity is weaker than restricting the agent's language.
We further discuss this distinction later in the paper.
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Formally, for some nite N  N, consider a sequence (1; 2; : : : ) 2
Q1
k=0
N(k), where each
k 2 N(k 1) denotes the (N -rational) k-th order beliefs. In other words, the agent forms N -
rational beliefs about  (rst order beliefs), N -rational beliefs about   Q() (second order
beliefs), and so on.
As we have already mentioned above, observe that the second order beliefs may attach positive
probability to the opponent holding some rational, but not necessarily N -rational rst order beliefs.
This is the case, for instance, when the agent's computational capacity is restricted by f1; : : : ; n 1g,
but her language is not, e.g., she does understand the sentence \E occurs with probability 1=n"
and she also deems possible that her opponent attaches probability 1=n to E, but she herself never
attaches probability 1=n to any event because for instance it is computationally very costly to form
beliefs beyond the bounds of f1; : : : ; n  1g.
Let TN0 :=
Q1
k=0
N(k), and impose the usual restriction of coherency and common certainty in
coherency,
(5.2) TN := TN0 \ TQ:
Types in TN are called N-rational. The following result shows that the agent's computational capacity
is necessarily preserved by the Bayesian representation. That is, if an agent's belief hierarchy is
restricted by some nite N  N, then the agent attaches an N -rational probability to every Borel
event in the canonical state space   TQ  TQ conditional on her own type. Moreover, every
N -rational probability measure on  TQ is the image of some N -rational type.
Proposition 5.2 g : TN ! N( TQ) is homeomorphic.
Let N := f1; : : : ; ng j n 2 N 	, and dene the space of rational types whose computational
capacity is bounded by some nite f1; : : : ; ng  N, i.e.,
(5.3) TN0 :=
[
N2N
TN :
Then, we recursively dene the types that (i) are certain that everybody's computational capacity
is bounded (by some nite set of denominators), (ii) are certain that everybody is certain that
everybody's computational capacity is bounded, and so on. Formally, let
TN1 :=

t 2 TN0 : g(t)( TN0 ) = 1
	
...
TNk :=

t 2 TN0 : g(t)( TNk 1) = 1
	
...
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and dene the types that have bounded computational capacity, and satisfy common certainty in
everybody's computational capacity is bounded by
(5.4) TN :=
1\
k=0
TNk :
Throughout the paper we call these types N -rational. The following result characterizes the U -
rational types in terms of a restriction on the bounds of the agent's computational capacity. More
specically, we show that the U -rational types are exactly those that
(i) have bounded computational capacity,
(ii) are certain that the opponent satises (i),
(iii) are certain that the opponent satises (ii),
and so on.
In other words, a type is U -rational if and only if it is N -rational.
Theorem 5.1 TU = TN .
The previous result is quite interesting as it provides foundations for the set of U -rational types
in terms of conditions imposed directly on the belief hierarchies rather than on the corresponding
Bayesian model.
Note that although U -rational types are shown to be the ones restricted by bounded computational
capacity and common certainty in bounded computational capacity, their language may not be
restricted by any nite N  N. We provide an example of such a case below.
Example 5.1 Consider the type space model (; Ta; Tb; ga; gb) such that  = f1; 2g, and Ta =
ft1a; t2a; : : : g and Tb = ft1b ; t2b ; : : : g. Moreover, for each k > 0, suppose that g(tka) assigns probability
1=k to (1; t
k
b ) and probability (k   1)=k to (2; tkb ), while g(tkb ) assigns probability 1=k to (1; tk+1a )
and probability (k   1)=k to (2; tk+1a ).
First, observe that Ti  TN and therefore Ti  TU for each i 2 fa; bg. Second, notice that for
every ` > k agent tki 's language contains the sentence \j attaches probability 1=` to 1", e.g., t
k
a
 is certain that \b attaches probability 1=k to 1",
 is certain that b is certain that a is certain that \b attaches probability 1=(k + 1) to 1",
 is certain that b is certain that a is certain that b is certain that a is certain that \b attaches
probability 1=(k + 2) to 1",
and so on.
Hence, tka's language is not bounded by any nite N  N, even though her computational capacity
is bounded by fkg 2 N . /
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The previous example illustrates the dierence between restricting one's language and restricting
her computational capacity. Restricting the agent's language implies that the agent cannot compute
values expressed by sentences outside this language. However, the converse is not necessarily true,
e.g., the agent may understand a sentence of the form \E occurs with probability p" and still never
hold these beliefs, simply because p is a very complex.
6. TOPOLOGICAL PROPERTIES OF RATIONAL TYPE SPACES
In this section we study the topological properties of the space of rational and universally rational
types. In fact, as it turns out, these spaces are suciently rich in that every type in the universal
type space can be approximated by a sequence of U -rational types.
Proposition 6.1 TU is dense in T .
The previous result is particularly interesting for the analysis of robustness of solution concepts
with respect to slight perturbations in the belief hierarchies in nite incomplete information games,
as for instance in Ely and Peski (2006), or Dekel et al. (2007).
7. COMMON RATIONAL BELIEF IN RATIONALITY
Consider a nite normal form game
 
I; (Si)i2I ; (Ui)i2I

, where I = fa; bg denotes the nite set of
players, with typical elements i and j. For every i 2 I, let Si, with typical element si, denote player
i's nite set of (pure) strategies, and Ui : Si  Sj ! R denote i's payo function. A probability
measure i 2 (Sj) is called i's conjecture about the opponent's action, with i(sj) denoting the
probability that i assigns to j playing sj. Given the conjecture i, player i's (subjective) expected
payo from playing si 2 Si is equal to
ui(si; i) :=
X
sj2Sj
i(sj) Ui(si; sj):
We say that si is a best reply to the conjecture i, and we write si 2 BRi(i), whenever ui(si; i) 
ui(s
0
i; i) for all s
0
i 2 Si.
Since this is a normal-form game where players do not observe each other's strategy before they
choose their own, each i forms a belief hierarchy consisting of a conjecture about j's strategy, a
conjecture about j's conjecture about i's strategy, and so on. As usual, we represent these belief
hierarchies with a type space model, (Sa; Sb; Ta; Tb; ga; gb), where Ti is a Polish type space, and
gi : Ti ! (Sj  Tj) is a continuous function. This construction diers from the one described
in Section 4, in that the two players form beliefs over dierent fundamental spaces, i.e., each i is
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uncertain only about Sj. This is because, as usual, we focus on belief hierarchies restricted by the
condition that players know their own actual strategy. An element (si; ti) 2 SiTi is called strategy-
type pair of player i, whereas each (sa; sb; ta; tb) 2 SaSbTaTb is called state (of the world). We
say that i is rational at a state (sa; sb; ta; tb) whenever si is a best reply to the conjecture about j's
strategy induced by ti.
Consider the set of states in Sa  Sb  T a  T b where both players are rational:
R0 :=

(sa; sb; ta; tb) 2 Sa  Sb  T a  T b : si 2 BRi
 
margSj g

i (ti)

; for all i 2 fa; bg 	 :
For every k > 0, inductively dene
Rk :=

(sa; sb; ta; tb) 2 Sa  Sb  T a  T b : gi (ti)(margSjT j R

k 1) = 1; for all i 2 fa; bg
	
;
and obtain the states that satisfy rationality and common belief in rationality, by
(7.1) R :=
1\
k=0
Rk:
At these states, not only is everybody rational, but also everybody believes that everybody is rational,
everybody believes that everybody believes that everybody is rational, and so on. The strategy proles
rationally played under common belief in rationality are the ones in
S := Sa  Sb(7.2)
:= projSa R
  projSb R:
These strategy proles are exactly those played under correlated rationalizability, and are the ones
surviving iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (Brandenburger and Dekel, 1987). In
two-player games, they also coincide with the set of rationalizable9 outcomes (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce,
1984).
Now, suppose that we restrict attention to players with rational belief hierarchies. Belief hierarchies
are represented by types in the type space (Sa; Sb; T
Q
a ; T
Q
b ; ga; gb), where T
Q
i is the space of all rational
belief hierarchies, and gi : T
Q
i ! (Sj  TQj ) is an injective mapping derived analogously to the one
in Proposition 4.2. Let Sa  Sb  TQa  TQb denote the set of states where both players have rational
belief hierarchies.
9The equivalence between rationalizability and correlated rationalizability does not hold in games with more than
two players (Pearce, 1984, p. 1035).
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Similarly to the unrestricted case, we recursively impose the following restrictions
RQ0 :=

(sa; sb; ta; tb) 2 Sa  Sb  TQa  TQb : si 2 BRi
 
margSj gi(ti)

; for all i 2 fa; bg 	
...
RQk :=

(sa; sb; ta; tb) 2 Sa  Sb  TQa  TQb : gi(ti)(margSjTQj R
Q
k 1) = 1; for all i 2 fa; bg
	
...
thus obtaining the states satisfying rationality and common rational belief in rationality by
(7.3) RQ :=
1\
k=0
RQk :
The strategy proles rationally played under common rational belief in rationality are
SQ := SQa  SQb(7.4)
:= projSa R
Q  projSb RQ:
Likewise, we can also dene the states that satisfy rationality and common universally rational
belief in rationality, denoted by RU . Finally, let SU denote the strategy proles that can be played
at some state in RU . Obviously, it follows by construction that
(7.5) SU  SQ  S:
In general, there are games where the second inclusion is strict10, e.g., there may exist pure strategies
which are optimal only to irrational conjectures, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 7.1 Consider, for instance, the following game played between Alexandra and Barney,
who choose among the row and column strategies respectively, i.e., Sa = fa1; a2; a3g and Sb = fb1; b2g.
Observe that the only rst order beliefs of Alexandra that would make a3 rational would be to
a3
a2
a1
b2b1
0
2
2 +
p
2
0
1
1
p
2
0
0
2
1
1
10Since we only consider nite games, the rst inclusion is always an equality, i.e., SU = SQ. This is because for all
k > 0, and for every t 2 TQ, there is some t0 2 TU such that `(t) = `(t0) for all `  k.
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attach probability
p
2=2 to the event that Barney plays b1. Thus, a3 belongs to projSa R

0 but not to
projSa R
Q
0 . Moreover, observe that projSaSb R

k = projSaSb R

0 and projSaSb R
Q
k = projSaSb R
Q
0 for
all k > 0, implying that a3 belongs to S

a but not to S
Q
a . /
However, as the following theorem shows, the previous case is non-generic. Recall that a result
holds generically, whenever for an arbitrary strategy space Sa  Sb, the payo vectors (Ua; Ub) 2
RjSaSbjRjSaSbj that make this result hold are of Lebesgue measure 1 in the space RjSaSbjRjSaSbj.
In fact, we show that the strategy proles rationally played under common U -rational belief in
rationality generically coincide to those rationally played under common belief in rationality.
Theorem 7.1 SU = S generically.
Obviously, the latter implies that SU generically contains the strategy proles surviving iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
8. DISCUSSION
In this section we relate the notion of rational belief hierarchies to other well-known concepts, and
we discuss possible interpretations of dierent rational type spaces.
Rational beliefs and unawareness. As we have already mentioned, rational probability measures
can be thought as beliefs of an agent whose language does not contain sentences of the form \E
occurs with probability p", for any irrational number p 2 [0; 1]. This idea is consistent with consider-
ing an agent who is unaware of the notion of irrational numbers and therefore does not understand
sentences that express probabilistic beliefs which involve irrational numbers. Identifying the agent's
language with the collection of events that the agent is aware is not new in the literature (e.g.,
Modica and Rustichini, 1999; Halpern, 2001; Heifetz et al., 2006; Li, 2009). The common character-
istic of these models is that each agent is endowed with a language | subjective view of the world |
and she can only reason within the bounds of this language. A straightforward consequence is that
she attaches positive probability only to events generated by this language.
Heifetz et al. (2006) introduced a generalized framework accommodating interactive unawareness.
In their model, each agent's language restricts not only what the agent is aware of, but also what the
agent believes that others are aware of. More specically, if an agent is unaware of a sentence, she is
also unaware of the possibility that someone else is aware of this sentence11. The latter is consistent
11Halpern and Re^go (2009) go one step further by allowing agents to be aware of the possibility of being unaware
of an event, thus accommodating situations where the agent deems possible that somebody else attaches positive
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with the way we construct rational belief hierarchies in Section 3 in that the k-th order rational beliefs
attach positive probability only to (k   1)-th order rational beliefs. From the previous discussion it
becomes clear why Theorem 4.1 is an intuitive contradiction. More specically, recall that we have
in mind an agent who is unaware of the concept of rational numbers. However, Theorem 4.1 says
that there are types associated with a rational belief hierarchy, which at the same time \assign
probability p 2 [0; 1] nQ to some Borel event B" in the canonical state space. Since we only consider
agents who hold conscious beliefs, it follows that these specic types will know the event \B occurs
with probability p", and therefore this last sentence will be part of their language, which in turn
contradicts our initial assumption that our agent is unaware of the concept of irrational numbers.
Bounded computational capacity. In Section 5, we provided a characterization of universally rational
belief hierarchies in terms of a bounded rationality condition which restricts the computational ca-
pacity of the players. Firstly, let us elaborate a bit on the dierence between bounded computational
capacity on the one hand and bounded language on the other. As we have already mentioned above,
when an agent's language is not suciently rich to describe certain probabilistic beliefs, the agent
is not even aware of the existence of these degrees of uncertainty. Therefore, discussing about the
agent's capacity to compute these beliefs is meaningless in the rst place. Conversely, an agent may
understand what
p
2=2 means but still nd it unnecessarily complex to compute beliefs with such
precision. Consider for instance an agent who simply adopts as her own probabilistic assessment the
estimation yielded by a computer whose output is restricted to at most ve decimals. Obviously, the
agent may still understand the notion of an irrational number. From the previous discussion it be-
comes apparent that in our model bounded language is strictly stronger than bounded computational
capacity.
There are quite a few papers in the literature that account for bounded computational capacity
in the players' belief formation. Megiddo (1989) models belief hierarchies when we restrict attention
only to computable beliefs. More recently, Eliaz (2003) and Spiegler (2004) have studied repeated
games with players who prefer to hold simpler beliefs about their opponents' strategies.
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probability to an event of which she herself is unaware.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF SECTION 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Consider an arbitrary  2 Q(X), and consider the set of singletons with positive
measure,
(A.1)   := fx 2 X : (fxg) > 0g:
First, we show that   is non-empty. Suppose that  is a non-atomic measure. Then, it follows from Fremlin (2003,
p. 46) that for every  2 (0; 1) there is some B 2 B such that (B) = , which contradicts  2 Q(X) if we consider
some  2 R n Q. Hence, there is at least one atom A 2 B. Now, it follows from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Lem.
12.18) that A contains a singleton of positive measure, implying that   is non-empty.
Second, we show that   is countable. Let f n ; n  1g be the countable partition of  , dened by
 n :=
n
x 2   : 1
n+ 1
< (fxg)  1
n
o
:
If   is uncountable, there is some n  1 such that  n is uncountable, implying that there is a countably innite
fx1; x2; : : : g   n. Finally, observe that
(X)  ( n)

1X
k=1
(fxkg)
>
1X
k=1
1
n+ 1
= 1;
which is a contradiction.
Third, we show that ( ) = 1. Assume otherwise, implying that (X n  ) > 0. Since   is countable, it is Borel,
implying thatXn  is also Borel. Hence, it follows from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Lem. 12.18) that there is x 2 Xn 
with (fxg) > 0, implying, by Eq. (A.1), that x 2  , which is a contradiction.
Now, suppose that   = fx1; x2; : : : g is innite. Observe that the sequence of rational numbers f(fxkg)gk> satisesP1
k=1 (fxkg) = 1. Then, it follows from Badea (1987, Prop., p. 225) that there is a subsequence fykgk>0 of fxkgk>0
such that
P1
k=1 (fykg) is an irrational number, thus contradicting the hypothesis that  2 Q(X).
Therefore,   is necessarily nite. Moreover, it is closed, as it is the nite union of singletons, implying that supp() =
 , which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: It follows from Billingsley (1968, p. 237) that the space of Borel probability measures
with nite support | denoted by S(X) and called space of simple probability measures | is dense in (X). It
follows from Proposition 2.1 that Q(X) is a subspace of S(X). Recall that denseness is transitive (Gupta, 2000,
Thm. 4.12), implying that it suces to show that Q(X) is dense in S(X).
Consider an arbitrary  2 S(X), with  () = fx1; : : : ; xng, and suppose without loss of generality that 0 
(fx1g)      (fxng)  1. Let fUki g1k=1 be a decreasing sequence of open neighborhoods of (fxig) with its radius
converging to 0, such that U1i \ U1i+1 = ; whenever (fxig) < (fxi+1g). Observe that for every k > 0 and each
i 2 f1; : : : ; ng there is ki 2 [0; 1]\Q\Uki such that k1 +   +kn = 1, thus inducing a sequence of rational probability
measures fkg such that 
k(fx1g); : : : ; k(fxng)
!  (fx1g); : : : ; (fxng)
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implying that k
w!  which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.3: It suces to show that an arbitrary convergent sequence fkg of elements of N (X)
has its limit in N (X), i.e., if k
w! , then  2 N (X).
Let N := maxn2N n. Let also d : X X ! R be a metric compatible with the topology on X, and for every x 2 X
and  > 0, dene an open neighborhood of x as B(x; ) := fx0 2 X : d(x; x0) < g.
Consider an arbitrary x 2 X, and suppose there is some  > 0 such that there are nitely many k > 0 with
k
 
B(x; )

> 0. Then, obviously, there are innitely many k > 0 such that k
 
B(x; )

= 0, implying that
lim inf k
 
B(x; )

= 0. Hence, it follows from k
w!  that  B(x; )  lim inf k B(x; ) = 0 (Aliprantis and Border,
1994, Thm. 15.3), implying that x =2   supp(). If, on the other hand, for every  > 0 there are innitely many
k > 0 such that k
 
B(x; )

> 0, it follows from k 2 N (X) that there are innitely many k > 0 such that
k
 
B(x; )
  1= N , where B(x; ) := fx0 2 X : d(x; x0)  g is the closure of B(x; ). Therefore,  B(x; ) 
lim supk
 
B(x; )
  1= N (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Thm. 15.3). Now, consider a sequence of positive reals fng
with n # 0, which induces a sequence of Borel events fB(x; n)g such that lim supn>0B(x; n) = fxg. Then, it follows
from 
 
lim supn>0B(x; n)
  lim supn>0  B(x; n)  1= N (Billingsley, 1995, Thm. 4.1) that (fxg)  1= N . Hence,
x 2 supp() if and only if (fxg)  1= N , implying that supp() is nite.
Let x 2 supp(). It follows from Aliprantis and Border (1994, Thm. 15.3) that for every  > 0,

 
B(x; )
  lim supk B(x; )
 lim supk
 
B(x; )

 lim inf k
 
B(x; )

  B(x; ):(A.2)
Since supp() is nite, there is some  > 0 such that x0 =2 B(x; ) for any x0 2 supp() n fxg, implying that

 
B(x; )

= 
 
B(x; )

= (fxg) for every  < . Hence, it follows from (A.2) that (fxg) = limk
 
B(x; )

. Finally,
since the sequence fk
 
B(x; )
g contains only elements of the nite set QN , it follows that limk B(x; ) 2 QN ,
which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: First, observe that Q(X) =
S
n2N
f1;:::;ng(X). It follows from Proposition 2.3 that
f1;:::;ng(X) is closed, and therefore Borel in (X) for every n 2 N, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF SECTION 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1: We proceed inductively to show that for every k  0
 k is embedded as a Borel subset of 	k, and
 Q(k) is embedded as a Borel subset of (	k).
First, observe that 0 = 	0 = , implying that 0 is embedded as a Borel subset of 	0 via the identity function.
It follows from Proposition 2.4 that Q(0) is a Borel subset of (	0). Hence, Q(0) is embedded as a Borel subset
of (	0) via the identity function.
Now, suppose that k is embedded as a Borel subset of 	k via #k : k ! 	k, and Q(k) is embedded as a
Borel subset of (	k) via k : 
Q(k) ! (	k). Dene the function #k+1 : k+1 ! 	k+1 such that for each
(k; k) 2 k Q(k), #k+1(k; k) :=
 
#k(k); k(k)

. Obviously, it follows from above that k+1 is embedded as
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a Borel subset of 	k+1 via #k+1, and therefore k+1 is homeomorphic to #k+1(k+1). Hence, (k+1) is homeomorphic
to 
 
#k+1(k+1)

. Since #k+1(k+1) is Borel in 	k+1, there is a homeomorphism 
 
#k+1(k+1)
 7! f 2 (	k+1) :

 
#k+1(k+1)

= 1g, where f 2 (	k+1) : 
 
#k+1(k+1)

= 1g is a Borel subset of (	k+1). The latter implies that
there is a homeomorphism k+1 : (k+1) ! f 2 (	k+1) : 
 
#k+1(k+1)

= 1g. By Proposition 2.4, Q(k+1)
is Borel in (k+1). Let k+1 : 
Q(k+1) ! f 2 (	k+1) : 
 
#k+1(k+1)

= 1g be the same mapping as k+1
but restricted in the domain Q(k+1). Then, it follows directly that k+1 embeds Q(k+1) as a Borel subset on
f 2 (	k+1) : 
 
#k+1(k+1)

= 1g and therefore on (	k+1), which completes the proof by induction. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX C: PROOFS OF SECTION 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1: Since 0 =  is Polish, it is by denition separable and metrizable. Supposing that
k is separable and metrizable, 
Q(k) is separable and metrizable too, as it is a subspace of (k), which is also
separable and metrizable (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Thm 15.12). Thus, k+1 = kQ(k) is also separable and
metrizable, and therefore it follows by induction that every k is separable and metrizable. Since k+1 2 Q(k) has
a nite support (by Proposition 2.1), it follows that it is tight, and therefore, by applying a version of Kolmogorov
extension theorem (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, Cor. 15.28), we prove the existence of a unique measure  2 (TQ0 )
that extends every k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: The proof follows directly from TQ = ft 2 TQc : f(t)( TQ) = 1g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Take two arbitrary 1; 2 2 , and consider the following sequence:
P1 :=

p1 2 Q(0) : p1() = 1, for some  2 f1; 2g
	
P2 :=

p2 2 Q(1) : p2(; p1) = 1, for some (; p1) 2 f1; 2g  P1
	
...
Pk :=

pk 2 Q(k 1) : pk(; p1; : : : ; pk 1) = 1, for some (; p1; : : : ; pk 1) 2 f1; 2g  P1      Pk 1
	
...
Let Tp be the set of types (p1; p2; : : : ) 2
Q
k>0 Pk that satisfy coherency and common certainty in coherency. Observe
that for every p1 2 P1 there are exactly two measures in P2 such that (p1; p2) does not contradict coherency. Likewise,
for every (p1; p2) 2 P1  P2 that does not contradict coherency, there are exactly two measures p3 2 P3 such that
(p1; p2; p3) does not contradict coherency and 1-fold certainty in coherency. Inductively, for each k > 1, for every
(p1; : : : ; pk 1) 2 P1  Pk 1 that does not contradict coherency, 1-fold, : : : , and (k 3)-fold certainty in coherency,
there are exactly two measures pk 2 Pk such that (p1; : : : ; pk) does not contradict coherency, 1-fold, : : : , and (k   2)-
fold certainty in coherency. Therefore, Tp has the same cardinality as f0; 1gN, implying that it is uncountable. Now,
consider a belief hierarchy (1; 2; : : : ) such that
1 is uniformly distributed over ,
2 is uniformly distributed over  projP1 Tp,
...
k is uniformly distributed over  projP1Pk 1 Tp
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...
First observe that (1; 2; : : : ) satises coherency and common certainty in coherency. Moreover, by construction
(1; 2; : : : ) 2 TQ, and therefore g(1; 2; : : : ) 2 (  TQ). However, observe that g(1; 2; : : : ) has an innite
support, and therefore by Proposition 2.1, g(1; 2; : : : ) =2 Q( TQ), which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX D: PROOFS OF SECTION 5
Proof of Proposition 5.1: The proof is rather straightforward. Consider an arbitrary t 2 TU . It follows from
t 2 TU0 that g(t) 2 Q(  TQ). Now, suppose that there is some t0 2 TQ n TU such that g(t)(  ft0g) > 0.
Since t0 =2 TU , it follows that there is some k  0 such that t0 =2 TUk , implying that t =2 TUk+1, which contradicts
t 2 TU . Therefore, g(TU )  Q(  TU ), implying, together with Proposition 4.2, that g : TU ! Q(  TU )
is an injection. Now, take an arbitrary  2 Q(  TU ). It follows by construction that  is associated with a U -
rational belief hierarchy, implying that g : TU ! Q(  TU ) is surjective. Finally, continuity follows directly from
Brandenburger and Dekel (1993, Prop. 2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: First, we show that g(TN )  N ( TQ). Consider an arbitrary (1; 2; : : : ) 2 TN .
It follows from Proposition 4.2 that there is some  2 ( TQ) such that g(1; 2; : : : ) = . It suces to show that
 2 N (TQ). For each k  0, let Bk denote the Borel -algebra in k. Since  extends every k+1, it follows that
for every Bk 2 Bk,
(D.1) k+1(Bk) = 

Bk 
1Y
`=k
Q(`)

:
Observe that every Borel event B   TQ is also Borel in Q1k=0Q(k), and
(D.2) B =
1\
k=0

projk B 
1Y
`=k
Q(`)

:
Then, it follows from Billingsley (1995, Thm. 4.1), together with Eq. (D.2), that
(B) = lim
k!1


projk B 
1Y
`=k
Q(`)

(D.1)
= lim
k!1
k+1
 
projk B

:
Since (projk B) 2 Bk and k+1 2 N (k), it follows that k+1
 
projk B
 2 QN . Since fk+1(projk B)gk>0 is a
convergent sequence taking nitely many values, it follows that the limit converges to one of these values. Therefore,
(B) 2 QN , which proves that  2 N ( TQ).
Showing that N ( TQ)  g(TN ) is straightforward, and it follows directly from N ( TQ)  Q( TQ).
Thus, we conclude that N ( TQ) = g(TN ), which together with Proposition 4.2 completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: First, we show that TU0 = T
N
0 . Consider some t 2 TU0 , implying that g(t) 2 Q(TQ).
By Proposition 2.1, g(t) has a nite support, implying that there is some n > 0 such that g(t) 2 f1;:::;ng(  TQ).
Hence, t 2 TN0 , which proves that TU0  TN0 . Now, consider some t 2 TN0 , implying that t 2 TN for some N 2 N .
Therefore, by Proposition 5.2, g(t) 2 N (  TQ), and therefore g(t) 2 Q(  TQ), implying that t 2 TU0 , thus
proving TN0  TU0 . Hence, TN0 = TU0 .
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Now, for an arbitrary k  0 suppose that for all `  k,
(D.3) TU0 \    \ TU` = TN0 \    \ TN` :
Then, we show that TU0 \    \ TUk+1 = TN0 \    \ TNk+1:
TU0 \    \ TUk+1 = TU0 \
 k\
`=0

t 2 TQ : g(t)( TU` ) = 1
	
= TU0 \

t 2 TQ : g(t)  (TU0 \    \ TUk ) = 1 	
=

t 2 TU0 : g(t)
 
 (TU0 \    \ TUk )

= 1
	
(D.3)
=

t 2 TN0 : g(t)
 
 (TN0 \    \ TNk )

= 1
	
=
k\
`=0

t 2 TN0 : g(t)( TN` ) = 1
	
= TN0 \
 k\
`=0

t 2 TN0 : g(t)( TN` ) = 1
	
= TN0 \    \ TNk+1:
Thus, it follows by induction that TU0 \    \ TUk = TN0 \    \ TNk for all k  0, implying that TU = TN . Q.E.D.
APPENDIX E: PROOFS OF SECTION 6
Lemma E.1 TQ is dense in T .
Proof: Consider an arbitrary t 2 T , and we show that there is a sequence of rational types converging to t in
the topology of weak convergence.
It follows from Proposition 2.2 that for every t 2 T  there is a sequence of rational probability measures on the
space   T  that converges to g(t), i.e., there is a sequence ftkgk>0 with tk 2 Q(  T ), such that tk w

! g(t).
Now, let Ti be a copy of T
, inducing a homeomorphism ri : Ti ! T . The elements of Ti are not yet associated with
any belief hierarchy. For each k > 0, dene the type space (; Ta; Tb; g
k
a ; g
k
b ), such that for each ti 2 Ti, and every
(; tj) 2  Tj ,
(E.1) gki (ti)(; tj) = 
ri(ti)
k
 
; rj(tj)

:
Observe that, by construction, for each k > 0, every ti is associated with a rational belief hierarchy. The latter induces
a mapping
ki : Ti ! TQ
that associates every ti to a sequence of rational types, fki (ti)gk>0. In other words, in the type space (; Ta; Tb; gka ; gkb ),
the type ti yields the same rational hierarchy as 
k
i (ti) does in (; T
Q
a ; T
Q
b ; ga; gb). Note that for dierent k's we may
obtain dierent hierarchies associated with ti. Finally, it suces to show that
(E.2) ki
 
r 1i (t
)
 w! t:
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Observe that, for every k > 0 and each ti 2 Ti, the rst order beliefs associated with ki (ti) are given by
1
 
ki (ti)

= marg g
 
ki (ti)

= marg g
k
i (ti)
(E.1)
= marg 
ri(ti)
k :
Since, 
ri(ti)
k
w! g ri(ti), it follows that f1(ki (ti))gk>0 weakly converges to the rst order beliefs associated with
ri(ti). Since the latter is true for each i 2 fa; bg and every ti 2 Ti, it follows that for every n > 0 the sequence of n-th
order rational beliefs fn(ki (ti))gk>0 weakly converges to the n-th order beliefs associated with ri(ti). Therefore, the
sequence of rational types fki (ti)gk>0 weakly converges to ri(ti), i.e., ki (ti) w

! ri(ti). Finally, set ti = r 1i (t), and
obtain Eq. (E.2), which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Lemma E.2 TU is dense in TQ.
Proof: Let (1; 2; : : : ) 2 TQ. Then, it suces to show that there is a sequence of N -rational | and therefore
by Theorem 5.1, U -rational | types ft`g1`=1, such that k(t`) w

! k for all k > 0. Now, for each ` > 0, dene
t` :=
 
1(t
`); 2(t
`); : : :

by
 k(t`) := k for all k < `, and
 k(t`) is such that marg k(t
`) = 1(t
`) and also k(t
`)
 
 f1(t`)g      fk 1(t`)g

= 1 for all k  `.
First, observe that by construction, for every ` > 0, the type t` is N -rational. Now, consider an arbitrary k > 0. Then,
it suces, for every " > 0, there is some `0 such that for every bounded and continuous real-valued function f , Z fdk(t`)  Z fdk < "
for all ` > `0. Set `0 = k and the proof is completed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.1: Recall that denseness is transitive. Then, the proof follows directly from Lemmas E.1
and E.2. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX F: PROOFS OF SECTION 7
Proof of Theorem 7.1: We show that generically each pure strategy is rationally played under some conjecture if
and only if it is rationally played under some rational conjecture. Then, since this is a nite game, for each rational con-
jecture there is some U -rational belief hierarchy inducing this conjecture. First, we simplify the notation we use through-
out the proof: Let Si = (s
1
i ; : : : ; s
K
i ) and Sj = (s
1
j ; : : : ; s
L
j ). For each si 2 Si, let Ui(si) :=
 
Ui(si; s
1
j ); : : : ; Ui(si; s
L
j )

.
Fix some arbitrary Uj 2 RjSiSj j and
 
Ui(s
1
i ); : : : ; Ui(s
k 1
i ); Ui(s
k+1
i ); : : : ; Ui(s
K
i )
 2 Rj(Si 1)Sj j. Then, we show that
the set
(F.1) Z :=

Ui(s
k
i ) 2 RjSj j : ski 2 (projSi R0) n (projSi RU0 )
	
is of Lebesgue measure 0 in RjSj j. Dene  : (Sj)! R by
(F.2) (i) := max
s0i2Sinfski g
ui(s
0
i; i);
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which is obviously continuous and convex in (Sj). Now, suppose that
 
Ui(s
k
i ; s
1
j ); : : : ; Ui(s
k
i ; s
L
j )
 2 Z. This implies
that
(F.3) ui(s
k
i ; i)  (i)
only holds with equality. Finally, observe that for every " > 0,

 
Ui(s
k
i ; s
1
j ) + "; : : : ; Ui(s
k
i ; s
L
j ) + "

=2 Z. This is because in this case, (F.3) holds with strict inequality for
the irrational conjecture i 2 (Sj) that solved it before. Therefore, by Proposition 2.2 there exists some
0i 2 Q(Sj) which would be suciently close to i and therefore by continuity it also satises (F.3).

 
Ui(s
k
i ; s
1
j )  "; : : : ; Ui(ski ; sLj )  "

=2 Z. The reason is that in this case, (F.3) does not hold for any conjecture,
rational or irrational.
Repeat the same argument for all Uj 2 RjSiSj j and
 
Ui(s
1
i ); : : : ; Ui(s
k 1
i ); Ui(s
k+1
i ); : : : ; Ui(s
K
i )
 2 Rj(Si 1)Sj j and
the proof is completed. Q.E.D.
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